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tween Medicare and secondary payers? In this article, we seek to answer these questions. First, we distinguish between employer-sponsored plans and the better-known Medigap plans, which are usually purchased by individuals. Second, we report on the extent to which employers provide and promise retiree coverage and how the number of covered employees has grown through the 1980s. Third, we provide insight into the question of promised versus received benefits by examining the vesting provisions for retiree coverage. Fourth, we highlight major copayment and utilization review mechanisms used by retiree plans. Finally, and most importantly, we provide the first thorough examination of the methods of benefit coordination used to allocate health care claims costs between Medicare, the private insurer, and the beneficiary.
Private Supplements To Medicare
Private supplemental coverage. Using a variety of data sets from 1977 to 1984, a number of researchers have analyzed the extent of private supplemental coverage and the characteristics of those who are covered. 2 They found that 66-82 percent of the elderly had some form of private supplemental coverage,. depending on the particular study and, in one case, the states analyzed. They also concluded that elderly who were younger, had higher incomes and higher educational attainment, were in good health, and were white, female, and married were more likely to have private supplemental coverage. Only one study provides insight into the broad spectrum of private coverage. 3 Of those with coverage, 54-72 percent had a Medigap policy; another 4-58 percent had hospital indemnity coverage, again depending on the state. Medigap plans almost always covered the Medicare Part A deductible and copayment and usually covered additional hospital days. Extra skilled nursing facility (SNF) days and non-Medicare-certified SNF care were rarely covered. Part B deductible coverage varied widely, however. Almost all plans covered the Part B copayments after the deductible was met, but most did not cover charges beyond those deemed reasonable by Medicare.
Employer-sponsored coverage, In contrast, employer-sponsored postretirement health benefits are believed to be essentially equivalent to those provided to active workers. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data from 1986 showed that 79 percent of those employees promised retiree coverage by medium and large private firms faced no change in coverage upon retirement at age sixty-five, and over 92 percent of those with retiree coverage promised through a state or local government also faced no change in benefits. 4 Elsewhere we have reported employer coverage for active private-sector workers based on 1981-1985 BLS data. 5 It is clear HEALTH AFFAIRS | Spring 1990 from that analysis that employer coverage is generally broader (that is, covers more services) and deeper (less cost sharing and lower stop-loss levels) than Medicare. Using 1977 data from the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey, Pamela Short and Alan Monheit showed that the scope of employer-sponsored coverage declined with the age of the retiree. 6 Thus, younger retirees were more likely to be covered and to have broader benefits.
Effects of coordination. The actual value of employer benefits to the retiree depends not only on the services covered, but also on the method of allocating claims costs among the private insurer, Medicare, and the retiree. Three coordination methods are thought to be common: coordination of benefits, carve-out, and exclusion.
Under the coordination-of-benefits method, the employer plan first calculates what it would pay regardless of Medicare. This method of coordination allows the Medicare payment to satisfy the private plan's deductible and coinsurance and other covered expenses to the extent covered by the private policy. Under the carve-out method, the private plan calculates what it would ordinarily pay, absent Medicare, and then subtracts the Medicare payment. The beneficiary is left with the deductible and copayment under the private plan. The exclusion method is between these extremes. Here, the private plan calculates its payment by applying its own deductible and coinsurance schedule to the out-ofpocket portion left after Medicare's payment is subtracted. Little is known about the prevalence of these various coordination methods, although Deborah Chollet and Robert Friedland have speculated that the carve-out plan is the most common.
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Conditioned promises. Finally, little is known about the extent to which those employees promised benefits ultimately retire with benefits. The issue is analogous to that of vesting in pension plans. To be eligible for promised benefits, one may have to work with a firm for a minimum number of years and/ or actually retire from that firm. Chollet reported that, in 1984, 79.1 percent of those retirees age sixty-five and over with employer-sponsored health benefits also had pension income.
8 This suggests that, for many retirees, the conditions of eligibility for pension may be the same as for retiree health benefits. Private pension plans usually vest, that is, give workers a property right in the plan, after ten years of service. Observed pension vesting rates are higher among unionized workers and those in large firms. However, this turns out to be a result of longer job tenure among these employees. Controlling for job tenure, workers in small, nonunion firms are actually more likely to be vested.
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of medical care and on the cost to the Medicare program. 10 In the best of these studies, Amy Taylor, Pamela Short, and Constance Horgan, using 1977 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) data in a series of multivariate regression models, found that, in the days prior to the prospective payment system (PPS), employer-sponsored plans had a much larger effect on Medicare Part A expenditures than did Medigap plans. With respect to physician use, the results of Taylor and colleagues tell a different story. Both group and, to a greater extent, individual supplemental coverage increased use of physicians and expenditures for office visits. Their data suggest that Medigap plans are more costly to Medicare Part B.
All of the estimates in the four studies are likely biased upward. That is, the true effect is probably smaller than estimated because the models do not adjust the estimates for the probability that someone will buy an individual plan or work for a company because it offers a postretirement package. If these persons are more disposed to use health services, the estimated coefficient will include not only the price effect of lower out-ofpocket coverage but also the adverse selection effect of those who would use more services anyway. Taylor and colleagues tested for this problem of self-selection and rejected it. However, they only compared the individual purchasers with all others and, as a result, may have contaminated their control group by including group insureds who chose their employer, in part, as a result of the retiree benefits offered. This tends to bias the test toward a finding of no difference.
Based on this literature, we have a good sense of the individual Medigap market, its covered services, and the characteristics of those purchasing coverage. To learn about employer-sponsored coverage, however, we must look elsewhere.
Data And Methods
Our analysis of coverage, vesting, and coordination rules used by employer plans relies on three data sources. First, we use the 1988 Employer Survey conducted by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA). For this nationally representative survey, a telephone questionnaire was administered to a random sample of private firms and nonfederal government entities, stratified by size. Of those firms offering health insurance benefits, the survey asked questions concerning coverage offered, utilization review mechanisms, premiums paid, and the size of deductibles. These questions were asked about the largest conventional, health maintenance organization (HMO), and preferred provider organization (PPO) plans in the firm. The survey also asked whether employees were promised retiree coverage and the number of retirees currently covered, by plan. Through repeated callbacks, the survey yielded 1,665 completed responses for a 70 percent response rate.
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Our second data source is the Retiree Follow-up Survey, also conducted by HIAA. Between November and December 1988, HIAA surveyed a random sample of 492 private firms that had indicated in the early spring survey that they offered retiree health benefits. This sampling frame included those firms that paid some or all of the premium for the retiree health benefits offered. It did not include continuation or conversion plans in which the employee essentially paid the full premium. The follow-up focused largely on issues of unfunded health plan liabilities. Under contract to us, HIAA added several questions dealing with the integration of Medicare and the private plan. Of the firms in the sample, thirty-eight were ineligible because of closure or merger. Another sixty-four were ineligible because they offered only benefits specified under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 to retirees. 12 This yielded a usable sample of 390 firms, of which 327 completed the survey. Thus, the Retiree Follow-up Survey achieved a response rate of 83.9 percent.
Finally, because it is important to observe how retiree coverage has changed over time, we also use data from the BLS 1981 and 1986 Employee Benefits Surveys. 13 Unlike the HIAA survey, these data are only representative of medium and large private, nonagricultural firms. Nonetheless, they are representative of approximately 45,000 establishments nationwide. While the definition of "medium" varies by industry, generally establishments with 250 or more employees were part of the sampling frame. The surveys were conducted by face-to-face interviews during which summary plan booklets for each plan were obtained. These booklets served as source documents to code benefit provisions. The data set, though extensive, provides only limited information on retiree benefits. It provides no direct information on the benefits actually provided to retirees. There were 1,295 and 1,308 respondents in 1981 and 1986, respectively, yielding response rates of 86 and 87 percent. ries of firms. The exception is among those firms offering HMOs. This difference more likely reflects more firms offering HMOs in 1986 than a major shift in retiree coverage. The final pair of columns in Exhibit 1 reports an alternative measure of promised coverage. An employer may guarantee access to an insurance plan but not actually make any contribution toward the premium. 15 Such plans allow the retiree to purchase coverage in one of the employer's group plans if the retiree pays the full premium. Such a premium will almost always be less expensive than an identical plan purchased individually but may include benefit provisions the retiree would not buy if purchasing an individual health insurance plan. The final two columns add in those employees promised this guaranteed access. 16 In 1986, an additional 1.9 million workers were promised such coverage. Production workers, those employed by smaller nonmanufacturing firms, and those working in the South were disproportionately likely to be promised "guaranteed access."
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Exhibit 2 shows that the plurality of employees promised retiree health benefits in 1986 were covered by self-insured plans. This is in marked contrast to 1981, when commercial plans dominated. The change is probably a result of employer actions to avoid state benefit mandates and premium taxes. 17 In 1986, 78.5 percent of those workers promised retiree benefits in medium and large firms had benefit pledges identical to the coverage given active workers. This reflects a dramatic change from 1981, when only 47.5 percent had comparable benefits. The change between 1981 and 1986 reflects greater benefits for retirees and not a reduction of benefits for active workers. Elsewhere, we have shown that the benefits of active workers expanded over the 1981-1985 period. 18 Exhibit 2 also shows that, among employees promised benefits in medium and large firms, the 1986 pledge generally implied no premium sharing upon retirement. Almost 70 percent of those in firms in which the employer pays something had a pledge that the employer would pay the entire premium. Using the broader measure, which includes continuation of coverage, some 57.5 percent of active workers were promised some form of coverage.
Finally, while the employee plan booklets were sometimes unclear, the 1986 BLS data suggest that the survivor of a deceased retiree will seldom lose employer-sponsored health benefits. Of those addressing the issue in their plan summary booklet, about one-third would have benefits continued for a limited period and two-thirds, for an indefinite period.
Exhibit 3 reports more recent data based on the 1988 HIAA Employer Survey. It shows that 57.8 percent of employees with health insurance were promised retiree insurance benefits in 1988. Two factors account for this different rate of coverage, relative to the BLS estimates. First, the HIAA sample includes small firms, state and local governments, and agriculture/ lumber-related establishments. Exhibit 3 shows that only a third of employees of small firms were promised retiree benefits. 19 In contrast, 74 percent of (nonfederal) government employees were promised benefits. This was the largest proportion of any industry group. Benefit provision was relatively low among agricultural employees; only 40 percent of those with active employee coverage had been promised retiree coverage. Second, the HIAA survey did not distinguish between insurance benefits promised in early retirement (prior to age sixty-five) and in normal retirement years (after age sixty-five). The BLS estimates, on the other hand, refer specifically to benefits promised in normal retirement. This lack of distinction in the HIAA survey leads to a small overstatement of benefits provided beyond age sixty-five. In the BLS data, some 12 percent of those promised benefits in early retirement had coverage terminated at age sixty-five, when Medicare becomes available. It is clear from both surveys, however, that the promise of retiree health benefits is a large-firm phenomenon. A large firm (1,000 or more employees) was three and one-half times more likely than a small firm (fewer than 100 employees) to promise retiree benefits, even when the small firm provided coverage to active workers.
Retiree coverage. The first two columns of Exhibit 4 show the percentage of actual retirees in 1988 with coverage by characteristics of the firm providing benefits. Of the retirees receiving employer-sponsored benefits, 37.2 percent were early retirees; the rest were age sixty-five or older. Among those retirees age sixty-five or older, 94.2 percent had retired Note: Coordination method rows do nor add co 100 for four reasons: (1) 7.2 percent of retirees were in firms with multiple retiree plans using different coordination methods; (2) 4.7 percent were in plans described as having no coordination; (3) 0.1 percent were in plans with no Medicare-eligible retirees: and (4) 0.9 percent of retirees were in plans for which the respondent was unable to identify the coordination method. a Percentages are conditional upon the firm's offering health insurance. b Reflects location of firm, not necessarily retiree.
from a firm with 1,000 or more employees. Almost none had retired from a firm with fewer than 100 employees. Not surprisingly, many retirees had coverage through a firm that has had a retiree plan for many years; 52.4 percent were in a plan that had existed for over ten years. It is surprising to note that coverage has decided regional overtones. Retirees of firms in the Northeast and the South were much more likely to have retiree coverage than those elsewhere. Since there is little regional variation in promised retiree coverage, we speculate that these regional differences result from age differences of retiree plans across regions. Covered services for retirees generally mirror those of active employ ees: 61.8 percent of retirees had insurance packages that benefits managers characterized as "about the same" as those provided to active workers; 31.9 percent were in plans described as less comprehensive than those offered active employees; and 8 percent had Medigap plans provided by the employer. 20 Generally, however, the benefits packages were broad. The HIAA Retiree Follow-up Survey found that virtually all retirees (94 percent) had coverage for prescription drugs; 91 percent, home health services; 73 percent, hospice care; and 66 percent, some form of coverage for nursing home care. The survey was unable to probe the depth or breadth of these coverages, however.
The survey did explore the extent to which retirees face insurance incentives to restrain health services use. Among currently covered retirees, 46.4 percent had employer-sponsored plans fully paid for by their former employer. These retirees faced no premium payment for their coverage. Over 53 percent of retirees faced some form of premium sharing. It is unknown how many eligible retirees declined employer coverage as a result of this payment. However, for those who paid something, the average monthly payment for individual coverage in 1988 was $26.07. This is well below the cost of most individually purchased Medigap plans. Two major individual Medigap plans in Alabama charge $50 and $44 monthly for coverage for those under age sixty-nine.
It is unclear whether retiree coverage costs more or less than that of active employees. On one hand, the elderly have higher utilization rates. On the other hand, the fact that Medicare is the primary payer should reduce plan costs dramatically. On average, the full monthly premium for individual retiree coverage was $91.67, while the conventional plan individual premium for active employees was $88.04 in these firms. We speculate that most employers are experience-rated or self-insured on a combined pool of active workers and retirees and that the premium generally reported is, implicitly, a weighted average of both groups.
Of retirees with employer benefits, 56.6 percent faced a hospital deductible. For those with individual coverage, the average deductible was $195.21. Retirees also faced a surprisingly high level of utilization review. For example, 76 percent of retirees faced preadmission certification; 78 percent, concurrent review; 61 percent, second surgical opinion; and 74 percent, large-claim case management. Using the HIAA Employer Survey, Steven DiCarlo and Thomas Musco reported that 65 percent of active employees in conventional plans had preadmission certification requirements, as did 79 percent of active PPO enro11ees. 21 Since retirees were overwhelmingly in conventional plans (88 percent conventional, 8 percent PPO, and 4 percent HMO), it is clear that they were much more likely to have utilization review mechanisms in place than were active, conventionally insured employees.
The HIAA Retiree Follow-up Survey examined the linkage between promised retiree benefits and their actual receipt. Of those firms offering retiree benefits, 74 percent required early retirees to have worked for the firm for a specified minimum number of years (91.5 percent of retirees met this requirement). Just over half of the firms specifying a minimum service requirement followed the eligibility rule of the company's pension plan. (Interestingly, less than 2 percent of those with early benefits had no pension plan.) Emily Andrews reported that most pension plans in larger firms have a ten-year service requirement before vesting, suggesting that this term is common for retiree health benefits as well.
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Coordination methods. The method of benefit coordination determines how much of a medical care claim is paid by the employer's retiree plan and how much by the retiree. The third column in Exhibit 4 shows that 66.3 percent of retirees were in plans that use the carve-out method. This method requires the retiree to pay the plan deductible and any coinsurance out of pocket before the private plan pays. Medicare pay ments do not count toward these copayments. Of the three methods, this one imposes the least claims liability on the employer's plan and the most on the retiree. As such, it has the greatest utilization control potential. The coordination-of-benefits method, which applies to 15 percent of current retirees, places the greatest liability on the employer plan. 23 Although the carve-out method dominated virtually all categories of employers, the expensive coordination-of-benefits method was relatively more common in the transportation/ utilities and finance/ insurance industries, and among firms that are large, with 100-999 retirees, and located in the West and South. Of retirees in plans over twenty years old, only 35.7 percent were in carve-out plans.
These coordination methods, at least for firms with retirees, appear to be commonly applied to other carriers as well as to Medicare; 84.8 percent of firms said they used the same coordination method with private carriers as they did with Medicare. This ranged from a high of 97.7 percent for those using the coordination-of-benefits method to a low of 66.9 percent for the exclusion method,
The importance of private cost-sharing and utilization review features for Medicare depends upon the coordination method used. Similarly, the importance of the coordination features depends upon whether and to what extent cost sharing exists. An employer-sponsored plan with no deductible or coinsurance, for example, will pay the same amount, after Medicare, regardless of the form of coordination. Thus, differences in coordination and benefits can reinforce or counteract one another. If firms seek to minimize their liability for retiree claims, they would link the carve-out method with high copayment conditions and extensive utilization review. We find that retirees in carve-out plans were least likely to face a deductible (48.2 percent, compared to 74 percent for coordination of benefits and 98.9 percent for exclusion). Also, their deductibles, on average, were lower ($189.36) than for retirees in plans using the coordination-of-benefits method ($272.49). In contrast, the use of preadmission certification was most common among the carve-out plans (87.3 percent, compared to 20.6 percent for coordination of benefits and 76.2 percent for exclusion). Thus, employers do not appear to be using the carve-out method with high deductibles to limit their retiree claims experience aggressively. They do apply less proven utilization review mechanisms, however.
Summary And Discussion
In this article, we have investigated five issues: (1) the size of the pool of retirees and future retirees covered by employers; (2) employer-sponsored benefits versus private Medigap coverage; (3) the extent of utilization controls present in retiree coverage; (4) the conditions for obtaining employer-sponsored coverage in the private sector; and (5) the methods of benefit coordination with Medicare.
Regarding coordination of benefits, the cost-saving potential of the carve-out plan is well known and has been advanced to employers as a means of limiting retiree claims payments. However, its savings to the employer and the burden it places on the retiree depend on other features of the plan. Consider the extreme case of no deductibles or coinsurance. In this scenario, the coordination method is irrelevant. Under any formula, the retiree pays nothing for covered services. As the deductibles and copayments increase, the retiree pays a greater share of the Medicare out-of-pocket bill when the employer chooses the carve-out plan. However, the maximum employer liability for Medicare-covered services is defined by the Medicare program. 24 As a first test of the benefits/ coordination interaction, we examined the percentage with a deductible and the size of the deductible by type of coordination method. One would expect those firms seeking to sharply limit their retiree benefits to use the carve-out method and to set high deductibles. Instead, we found that the carve-out plans had a higher percentage of retirees with no deductible and, generally, lower deduct- ibles when present at all. Thus, while carve-out coordination increases the retiree's out-of-pocket expense relative to other coordination methods, carve-out plans contain broad coverage, thereby diminishing the potential moderating effect on retirees' use of services.
The future of promised benefits. On the basis of our data on promised coverage, it appears that an increasing number of retirees will have employer-sponsored coverage. Further, the benefit is increasingly found in the plans offered by medium-sized firms (100-999 employees). Finally, if anything, benefit packages are expanding. This suggests good days ahead for retirees and higher costs for Medicare.
However, such a conclusion may go too far in that it ignores recent legal and administrative actions. First, the courts are increasingly giving plans the power to change retiree benefit provisions if the plan descriptions clearly and consistently say the employer retains this right. Second, the proposed rules of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) would require firms to account explicitly for the liability of promised retiree health benefits. 25 This action, together with the legal views noted above, suggest that benefit expansion may be stopped and even reversed. DiCarlo and colleagues suggested this may be the case. 26 They showed that while only 5 percent of employers with retiree plans intended to drop coverage, over 10 percent intended to cut benefits and over 30 percent intended to increase retiree deductibles and coinsurance. Intent to change and actual change may, of course, be two different things. In any event, given the changes of the past two years, it is more risky than usual to project the future based on the past.
It is also clear from these results why the more affluent elderly were so outraged by the Medicare catastrophic legislation. Not only would they have had to have paid a disproportionate share of the program costs, but they would have received almost no additional benefits. Hospital copay ments, physician visits, and particularly prescription drug coverage were already provided. Further, unlike those with Medigap plans, these elderly had little incentive to drop the private coverage they formerly held. Forty-six percent had premiums fully paid by their former employerthat is, these elderly had already worked and earned this part of their compensation package. The taxes and additional Medicare premiums they were required to pay were almost a total transfer to other elderly.
If proponents of government-sponsored catastrophic or long-term care insurance wish to make another attempt at writing legislation, they must find some mechanism to account for those with employer-sponsored benefits. Given the number of current retirees with benefits and the large number of current workers who have been promised retiree benefits, it would seem that a more carefully targeted program would be in order. 
